Wham Kwok Han Jolovan v Attorney-General (scandalising contempt)

Educational summary of named public judgments. Not legal advice.

Wham Kwok Han Jolovan v Attorney-General and other appeals [2020] SGCA 16 is the first case on scandalising contempt to reach Singapore’s apex court under the Administration of Justice (Protection) Act (AJPA). It explains what makes a statement contempt of court by scandalising the judiciary.

Key points at a glance

• Scandalising contempt is an offence under section 3(1)(a) of the AJPA.
• It has two limbs: the statement impugns a court’s integrity or impartiality, and it poses a risk to public confidence in the administration of justice.
• The AJPA deliberately adopted a “risk” standard, to be applied pragmatically.

Why this case matters

The AJPA codified the law of contempt in 2016, and this decision is the first time the Court of Appeal applied its scandalising-contempt provision. It clarifies the boundary between legitimate criticism of the courts, which is permitted, and statements that undermine public confidence in the administration of justice, which are not.

The facts (public judgment)

Two individuals published public social-media posts. One asserted, in substance, that Singapore’s judiciary was less independent than another country’s for cases with political implications; the other linked to that post and endorsed it. Both were convicted of scandalising contempt — the first such convictions under the AJPA.

The test the Court applied

The Court explained that section 3(1)(a) requires two things: first, that the statement impugns the integrity or impartiality of a court; and second, that it poses a risk that public confidence in the administration of justice would be undermined. Parliament replaced the older “real risk” standard with a bare “risk” standard, to be applied pragmatically — the operative question being whether a reasonable person encountering the statement would think the risk was one that needed to be guarded against. The defence of fair criticism did not assist here, because the comparisons drawn had no objective basis.

The outcome

The Court dismissed the appeals against conviction and sentence, affirming fines of $5,000 each. It granted an injunction requiring one of the posts to be removed, but declined to order a mandatory apology, which it reserved for exceptional cases.

The balance with free expression

Scandalising contempt sits at a sensitive intersection with free expression, and the Court was careful to mark the line. Criticism of the courts — even robust, pointed criticism — is permitted where it is fair and made in good faith; what the offence targets is conduct that undermines public confidence in the administration of justice, such as unfounded allegations of bias or corruption. The “fair criticism” defence protects legitimate comment, but it requires an objective basis; assertions with no such basis fall outside it.

Why the case is significant

As the first application of the AJPA’s scandalising-contempt provision by the apex court, the decision is the reference point for how the codified offence works, including the deliberately pragmatic “risk” standard that Parliament adopted in place of the older “real risk” test. It also illustrates the range of remedies available — not only fines or imprisonment, but injunctions to remove offending material, and, in exceptional cases, apology orders — showing that the response can be tailored to the situation.

Where the line falls in practice

The practical question in scandalising-contempt cases is where legitimate criticism ends and contempt begins. Robust disagreement with a decision, analysis of a judgment, and calls for law reform are all permitted; what crosses the line is an unfounded assertion that the courts are biased, corrupt, or lack independence, made without an objective basis. The “fair criticism” defence protects good-faith comment grounded in fact, which is why the presence or absence of an objective basis for a statement is often decisive.

The range of responses available

The decision also shows that the court’s response can be tailored. Beyond fines or imprisonment, the court can grant an injunction requiring offending material to be removed and not republished, and, in exceptional cases, order an apology. That flexibility allows the court to address the specific harm — for example, by having a damaging statement taken down — rather than relying on punishment alone. For anyone commenting publicly on the courts, the case is a reminder that criticism is protected, but unfounded attacks on judicial integrity are not.

Why the offence exists at all

Scandalising contempt can seem in tension with free speech, but its rationale is narrow: the administration of justice depends on public confidence, and unfounded attacks on the integrity of the courts can erode that confidence in a way that harms everyone who relies on the legal system. The offence is not designed to shield judges from criticism — fair criticism is expressly protected — but to guard against baseless allegations that undermine trust in the courts. The codification of the law in the governing statute was intended to make these boundaries clearer.

Where the line falls, and the range of responses

The practical question in scandalising-contempt cases is where legitimate criticism ends and contempt begins. Robust disagreement with a decision, analysis of a judgment, and calls for law reform are all permitted; what crosses the line is an unfounded assertion that the courts are biased, corrupt, or lack independence, made without an objective basis. The “fair criticism” defence protects good-faith comment grounded in fact, which is why the presence or absence of an objective basis is often decisive. The decision also shows that the court’s response can be tailored: beyond fines or imprisonment, the court can grant an injunction requiring offending material to be removed, and, in exceptional cases, order an apology. For anyone commenting publicly on the courts — including on social media — the case is a reminder that criticism is protected, but baseless attacks on judicial integrity are not.

Frequently asked questions

Is criticising the courts illegal? No — fair, good-faith criticism is permitted; the offence targets statements that undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.

What is the “risk” standard? The AJPA asks whether a statement poses a risk to public confidence in justice, applied pragmatically from the perspective of a reasonable person.

What penalties apply? Scandalising contempt can attract a fine and/or imprisonment; here, fines were imposed and an injunction granted.

Can I comment on a court decision I disagree with? Yes — fair, good-faith criticism of a decision is permitted; the offence targets statements that undermine confidence in the justice system without an objective basis.

Can I criticise a judgment I think is wrong? Yes — fair, reasoned criticism is permitted; the offence targets unfounded attacks on the integrity or impartiality of the courts.

What remedies can the court order? Fines, imprisonment, injunctions to remove material, and, exceptionally, apology orders.

Can I criticise a court decision? Yes — fair, reasoned criticism is permitted; the offence targets unfounded attacks on the integrity or impartiality of the courts.

What remedies can the court order? Fines, imprisonment, injunctions to remove material, and, exceptionally, apology orders.

This page is an educational summary of themes from named, publicly available Singapore judgments and statutes. It is general information, not legal advice, and reading it does not create a solicitor–client relationship. Sentencing frameworks and penalties are applied to each case’s facts and may be changed by later decisions or amendments. Speak with a qualified criminal lawyer about your own situation.